. I propose a social learning model that investigates how con rmatory bias a ects public opinion when agents exchange information over a social network. For that, besides exchanging opinions with friends, individuals observe a public sequence of potentially ambiguous signals and they interpret it according to a rule that accounts for con rmation bias. I rst show that, regardless the level of ambiguity and both in the case of a single individual or of a networked society, only two types of opinions might be formed and both are biased. One opinion type, however, is necessarily less biased (more e cient) than the other depending on the state of the world. e size of both biases depends on the ambiguity level and the relative magnitude of the state and con rmatory biases. In this context, long-run learning is not a ained even when individuals interpret ambiguity impartially. Finally, since it is not trivial to ascertain analytically the probability of emergence of the e cient consensus when individuals are connected through a social network and have di erent priors, I use simulations to analyze its determinants. ree main results derived from this exercise are that, in expected terms, i) some network topologies are more conducive to consensus e ciency, ii) some degree of partisanship enhances consensus e ciency even under con rmatory bias and iii) open-mindedness, i.e. when partisans agree to exchange opinions with other partisans with polar opposite beliefs, might harm e ciency in some cases.
I
Individuals form opinions over a myriad of economic, political and social issues based on information they get from both media and trustworthy acquaintances such as friends, coworkers, professors, family members, etc. is process of information acquisition usually takes place when the issue being discussed has no clear-cut right/wrong or true/false distinction or when the set of information available is not easily or readily understood by individuals. In this case, consulting friends opinions has its appeal since it is an easy way to gather information. For that, social networks appear as a primary tool for many people to get informed and debate their world views.
In view of this, it is important to understand how beliefs depend on the way agents perceive and process the information and on the social network structure. With this regard, I examine one potential aspect of learning in social networks: how public opinion is a ected by con rmation bias?
Con rmation bias, as the term is typically employed in the psychology literature, connotes the interpretation of evidence in ways that are in line with existing beliefs. In this sense, an individual is said to su er from con rmatory bias if he tends to interpret ambiguous evidence as con rming his current belief. is can be done in di erent ways, like restricting a ention to favored hypothesis, disregarding evidence that could falsify the current world view or overweighting positive con rmatory instances, etc. In all cases, individuals restrict a ention to a single hypothesis and, for that, fail to give appropriate consideration to alternative hypotheses and this process creates a friction in belief formation.
As per the social psychology literature, individuals show the tendency to interpret ambiguous evidences as supporting their initial impressions. For instance, banks and companies may misinterpret Central Banks' stance toward high in ation a er ambiguous statements, professors may misinterpret the quality of students a er ambiguous performance, people may misinterpret scientists a er ambiguous announcements, etc. In this view, while relying on friends might help individuals to aggregate the information in some cases, in others it might lead individuals to expose themselves to other individuals that rely on their own world view to derive information from ambiguous evidence. In these cases, e cient aggregation of information is not guaranteed and I investigate how social opinion is a ected by that.
To analyze such phenomenon, I consider a society where agents are interested in learning some underlying state Â 2 D OE0; 1. For example, this underlying state Â might represent the degree (from 0 to 1, say) in which the anthropic activity causes global warming. All agents have a initial prior belief about it and observe a sequence of public signals, one at each date t. Signals are either i) informative, ii) uninformative or iii) ambiguous. Signals in the class i) are simply binary variables that indicate 1 if right states are more likely and 0 if le states are more likely. erefore, even though there is no noise in the signal, agents can only learn the state (the right proportion of 1's and 0's) asymptotically. Signals in the class ii) are simply disregarded for not being informative and, for that, prior beliefs are kept unchanged. Finally, signals in the class iii), the ambiguous one, are open to interpretation. In this case, I allow agents to interpret them using a fairly general randomization rule proposed by Fryer, Harms, and Jackson (2018) that accounts for con rmation bias. As per this rule, the interpretation of the ambiguous signal received at time t is in uenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by the likelihood of 0 and 1 at time t 1 (more details below). Ambiguity in this context has nothing to do with the noise of a signal in standard information theory or with the classical notion of ambiguity aversion as de ned by Ellsberg (1961) .
Instead, is just a way of capturing the situations in which people feel compelled to give meaning to ambiguous evidences about the issue or subject analyzed.
As in Jadbabaie, Molavi, Sandroni, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) , information exchange between agents result from multilateral communication. Before the beginning of each period, all agents meet their social media friends and observe their opinions and precisions about the subject of interest. At the beginning of every period t , the public signal is realized. us, each agent rst interprets ambiguous signals (if the case) using the randomization rule, stores it and computes his Bayesian posterior opinion and precision. A er that, every agent sets his nal opinions and precisions to be a linear combination of the Bayesian posterior opinion and precision computed with the interpreted signal and the opinions and precisions of neighbors met in the period before. e social connectivity among agents is xed over time and strong connectivity is assumed, i.e. all agents are exposed to all the other agents either through a directed or undirected path in the social networks.
I show that, regardless the level of ambiguity and both in the case of a single individual or a connected society, only two types of opinions can emerge and both are biased, one le -biased and the other right-biased. One opinion type, however, is more e cient (less biased) than the other depending on the magnitude of the state. Opinion e ciency, in this case, is only guaranteed under a "favorable" combination of "low" ambiguity and "su ciently pronounced" state. If this condition holds, I show that the e cient consensus is a ained with probability 1, otherwise, e cient consensus is reached with some probability. Moreover, long-run learning is not a ained even if individuals are impartial when interpreting ambiguous signals. ose results contrast with some results presented by Rabin and Schrag (1999) and Fryer et al. (2018) , where long-run learning takes place with a positive probability and impartiality helps learning the state. Furthermore, the network e ect presented here, together with signals realizations, reinforces the interpreting "tug-of-war" since individuals might have their own biases con rmed (or mitigated) by other agents.
Finally, since it is not trivial to derive analytically the probability of emergence of the most e cient (less biased) consensus, I use graphs simulations to show its determinants. I show that the presence of partisan agents in societies who su er from con rmatory bias has a double e ect on the expected consensus e ciency: i) it helps to countervail the misinterpretation of initial signals when there degree of partisanship is low and for that it increases expected e ciency;
and ii) exacerbates misinterpretation of signals when the degree of partisanship is high, reducing expected consensus e ciency. Moreover, I also show that open-mindedness of partisan agents, i.e. when partisans agree to exchange opinions with partisans with polar opposite beliefs, might reduce expected consensus e ciency in some social topologies.
is work, even though it does not generalize results for other conjugate families, seems su ciently general to capture some relevant real-world situations. e public signals realized every period and observed by all agents might represent the information reported by media outlets, such as TV channels, Radio, Youtube, Twi er, etc. e level of ambiguity of the information content reported by such outlets, measured by a parameter , represents the fraction of instances where a signal conveys two polar opposite meanings at the same time and agents feel impelled to interpret them. In this regard, agents can be more or less biased when interpreting signals. ey can be biased and conform the interpretation with their prior to some extent, be impartial and choose an interpretation uniformly at random (say 0 or 1'with the same probability 1 2 each) or even go against their world-view. e interpretation behavior of every agent is dictated by the parameters of the signal interpretation function. e structure of this work is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 describes a framework for updating beliefs when agents communicate over a social network and evidences (signals) are potentially open to interpretation and present the main theoretical results.
Section 4 describes a simulation exercise when there is priors heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes.
ere are four appendices. Appendices A and B contain the primitives of the Beta-Bernoulli conjugate family employed in this work. Appendix C contains the proofs of auxiliary results, whereas Appendix D presents the proofs main results.
L
A great deal of empirical evidence on social psychology supports the idea that the con rmation bias is extensive and that it appears in many ways. Nickerson (1998) argues that most studies in the eld con rm the human tendency of casting doubt on information that con icts with preexisting beliefs and to be more likely to see ambiguous information to be con rming of preexisting beliefs.
is selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence, however, takes place without intending to treat evidence in a biased way or even being aware of doing so. Molden and Higgins (2004, 2008) identify that both vagueness (when the evidence is weak) and ambiguity (when the evidence is con icting) in uence the interpretation of an uncertain evidence, whereas Furnham and Ribchester (1995) and Furnham and Marks (2013) nd evidences that the way individuals perceive and process information about ambiguous situations is related to their degree of ambiguity tolerance.
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In this context, con rmation bias can be seen as an information process that departs from standard Bayesian updating because agents scrutinize ambiguous signals in line with their world views. Some examples of decision-making models that account for Bayesian updating deviation are Hellman and Cover (1970) , Rabin and Schrag (1999) , Wilson (2014) and Fryer et al. (2018) .
In Rabin and Schrag (1999) , for instance, signals believed to be less likely are misinterpreted with an exogenous probability, whereas in Fryer et al. (2018) , in its simplest version with binary states, ambiguous signals are produced with certain probability and agents interpret those before performing the Bayesian update. To interpret such signals individuals employ three methods that simply di er in the intensity with which agents conform their interpretation with their current world-view.
In this regard, Rabin and Schrag (1999) and Fryer et al. (2018) are the closest references to this work, both in spirit and results. In this work, however, I move away from the binary state space case and allow states to be continuously distributed over the unit interval according to a Beta distribution. Binary signals are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution, ambiguous signals appear with some positive probability and I allow agents to use the interpretation strategies proposed in Fryer et al. (2018) . Two important implication of such modeling strategy are that an impartial interpretation strategy ( ipping a fair coin to interpret ambiguous signals, for instance) is not su cient to overcome con rmatory bias and that long-run learning is not a ained even when ambiguity level is "su ciently" low. Moreover, I introduce a network structure among agents and allow them to set their nal beliefs to be a linear combination of the Bayesian posterior and the opinions of their neighbors as in Jadbabaie et al. (2012) . In this case, since there are network externalities, is not immediately clear how opinions will evolve as interpretations are in uenced by both the realization of signals and the con rmatory biases of friends. One important implication of network externalities is that some network topologies induce less biased consensus when there is heterogeneity of initial priors. 1 More recently the concept of tolerance of ambiguity has been conceived by part of scholars to re ect the contemporary de nition of ambiguity proposed by Ellsberg (1961) . For a good coverage of the classical literature on ambiguity aversion, see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) , Epstein and Schneider (2007). is work is also related to the literature of biased assimilation in networks. In a nutshell, this literature focus on models of social learning in which agents have tendency to overweight the opinion of friends with similar beliefs. Some examples are Hegselmann and Krause (2002) , Hegselmann and Krause (2005) , Dandekar, Goel, and Lee (2013) and Mao, Bolouki, and Akyol (2018) . While bias assimilation has to do with the tendency to conform with the majority or leading individuals, con rmatory bias, as argued above, is some sort of failure in the Bayesian updating process. From this perspective, modeling con rmatory bias as either a biased assimilation or a failure in the Bayesian update has di erent consequences. On the one hand, bias assimilation presumes that the connections between agents are broken (or temporarily interrupted) according to how "far" opinions are and, therefore, it implies in non trivial changes in the topology of the network. us, a natural result found in this literature is that long run polarization takes place when there is biased assimilation. us, polarization is a natural product of the initial heterophily of opinions in the system and the eventual permanent deletion of some links. On the other hand, modeling con rmatory bias as a Bayesian update failure, like this work, is inconsequential to the network topology and under the strong connectivity assumption leads to a bias (misinformation) that can be analytically studied.
Finally, there exists a great deal of works on social learning, both assuming bounded and fully rationality. e Bayesian social learning literature (fully rational agents) mainly focuses on formulating stylized games with incomplete information and characterizing its equilibria. More speci cally, rather than considering complex and repeated interactions, most part of the works focuses on environments where agents are myopic or interact only once. Some works of reference are Banerjee (1992), Bala and Goyal (1998), Bala and Goyal (2001) , Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) , Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011). 2 On the other hand, the non-bayesian learning (bounded rational agents) literature focus on studying generalizations or departures of the seminal DeGroot (1974) model. For instance, DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) show that the classical consensus result does not rely on the social weighting matrix being a stationary matrix, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi (2010) consider a random meeting (Poisson) model and characterize how the presence of forceful agents, i.e. agents who in uence others disproportionately and hardly revise their beliefs, interferes with information aggregation, whereas Golub and Jackson (2010) show that convergence holds if (and only if) the in uence of the most in uential agent vanishes as the society grows unboundedly. Jadbabaie et al. (2012) is the rst work to consider the possibility of constant arrival of informative signals every period of time in networked environments. e novelty in the paper is that the update rule that sets the nal belief to be a linear combination of the Bayesian posterior and the opinions of her neighbors is an e cient alternative to the complicated task of implementing Bayesian update in networks. Lastly, Azzimonti and Fernandes (2018) , similar to this work in modeling strategy, investigate how the structure of social networks and the presence of fake news a ect the degree of polarization and misinformation. e two major di erences with respect to this paper are that i) their model consider the presence of stubborn agents called Internet bots whose sole purpose is to deceive other agents, whereas the main source of bias in my model derives from con rmatory bias; and ii) that the connectivity among all agents evolves stochastically, whereas it is xed in this paper. ose two features together are the main drivers of misinformation and polarization cycles in a dynamic system that does not reach convergence, whereas my model focus on understanding how misinformation depends on both the structure of the network and the way agents interpret ambiguous signals. de ne v > as the transpose of the vector x and for that, the inner (scalar) product of two vectors x; y 2 R n is denoted by x > y. I denote by 1 the vector with all entries equal to 1. A matrix W is said to have size m n whenever W has exactly m rows and n columns. Moreover, whenever m D n, W is called a square matrix of size n. e identity matrix of size n is denoted by I. For a matrix W , I write W ij to denote the entry in the i -th row and j -th column. e notation W k ij is used to denote the entry in the i -th row and j -th column of the matrix W k , i.e. the matrix W raised to the power k. Finally, a vector v is said to be a stochastic vector when v 0 and P i v i D 1. A square matrix W is said to be a (row) stochastic matrix when each row of W is a stochastic vector.
3.1. Network structure.
e connectivity among agents in a network is described by a directed graph G D .N; g/, where N D f1; 2; : : : ; ng is the set of agents, xed over time, and g is a realvalued n n adjacency (or incidence) matrix, also xed over time. Each element g ij in the directedgraph represents the connection between agents i and j . More precisely, g ij D 1 if individual i is paying a ention to (e.g. receiving information from) individual j , and 0 otherwise. Since the graph is directed, it is possible that some agents pay a ention to others who are not necessarily reciprocating, i.e. g ij ¤ g j i . e out-neighborhood of any agent i represents the set of agents that i is receiving information from (e.g. i 's references), and is denoted by
Similarly, the in-neighborhood of any agent i , denoted by N i n i .g/, represents the set of agents that are receiving information from i (i.e. i 's followers), N i n i .g/ D fj W g j i D 1g. We de ne a directed path in G from agent i to agent j as a sequence of agents starting with i and ending with j such that each agent is a neighbor of the next agent in the sequence. We say that a social network is strongly connected if there exists a directed path from each agent to any other agent. For instance, one may nd useful to interpret as the degree to which the anthropic activity might cause global warming, such that a state close to 0 means that human activity has no impact on global warming, whereas a state close to 1 means that human activity is fully responsible for the global warming. I assume that each agent i in this society starts with an initial belief about an underlying state f i;0 .Â/ 2 , represented by a Beta probability distribution over the set with shape parameters˛i ;0 ;ˇi ;0 > 0. Given prior beliefs, I denote by opinion of agent i at time t by y i;t
Conditional on the state of the world Â, every agent observes a sequence of public signals s t , one at each date t 2 f1; 2; : : : g. Public signals lie in the set S D f1; 0; a; ;g. As per the example of global warming given above, a signal 1 is evidence that human activity is the main responsible for global warming, a signal 0 is evidence on the contrary (no responsibility), the signal ; contains no information and a signal a is ambiguous and open to idiosyncratic interpretation (section 3.3 explains how agents deal with those signals).
Signals are independent over time, conditional on the state. With probability ı 2 D D OE0; 1, independent of the state, the no informational signal ; is observed and with probability .1 ı/ some signal is observed. Conditional on observing a signal, the probability that the new signal is ambiguous is 2 M D .0; 1. In this case, the signal conveys informational aspects that could lead one to interpret as either 1 or 0. With the remaining probability 1 the information provided by the signal is clear. In any state Â 2 , the probability that an unambiguous signal is 1 is Â 2 .0; 1/ and 0 with probability 1 Â. e signal structure is depicted in the Furthermore, one may also think that people might interpret ambiguous information in di erent ways. A potential one is to use their prior assessment of the subject to categorize the ambiguous signal, i.e. the interpretation of an ambiguous signal s t D a as 0 or 1 could depend on how the agent perceives the state, i.e. if Â D 0 is more likely than Â D 1 (likelihood ratio greater than one), then the agent could be prone to store s t D a as 0 and vice-versa. Conversely, the agent could interpret s t D a as 0 or 1 depending on the mode of his belief, i.e. if the mode is greater (less) than 0.5, then agent stores the ambiguous signal as 1 (as 0). In this sense, the interpretation depends on the intensity of the con rmatory bias intensity.
agent i interprets the ambiguous signals as 1 and with the remaining probability .1 i;t / interprets the ambiguous signals as 0 at time t . 5 erefore, the parameter i;t represents the intensity of the con rmatory bias experienced by any individual i at any time t and its distribution over time can be very general. I only assume i;t to be independent of opinion y i;t for any i 2 N , history of opinions of all individuals and all other parameters in this model. From this randomization rule, there are three de nitions of interest.
De nition 1. An individual i 2 N
(1) has con rmatory tendency if 1 2
. Two distinctions apply: 
where i;t is as de ned in Equation (1), s t is the publicly observed signal and u t is the realization of a continuous U OE0; 1 random variable at time t simply used to break the tie. e draws fu t g are independent across time and also independent of all other random variables in this model.
In words, the signal interpretation functions are basically transforming the observed signals
into binary interpretations. When the realized public signal is s t D 1 (s t D 0), all agents undoubtedly interpret it as 1 (as 0) and set s .g/.
ese neighbors share their world-views, summarized by˛j ;t andˇj ;t for all j 2 N out i
.g t /.
6 At the beginning of period t , a signal pro le is realized and the signal s i;t is privately observed by agent i. A er observing the public signal s t , agent i computes his posterior in a standard Bayesian fashion. Following Jadbabaie et al. (2012), I assume that the nal parameters˛andw ill be a convex combination between the parameters˛andˇof his Bayesian posterior and the weighted average of the his neighbors parameters.
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In mathematical terms, the update rule is as follows
Notice that when b D 1, agents fully rely on the signals and behave like a standard Bayesian agent. As b approaches zero, agents are more in uenced by the network, as more weight is given to his neighbors' opinions. Moreover, let˛t D .˛1 ;t ;˛2 ;t ; : : : ;˛n ;t / > andˇt D .ˇ1 ;t ;ˇ2 ;t ; : : : ;ˇn ;t / > denote the column vectors of length n of agents beliefs parameters at time t , I be an identity matrix of dimension n and B D diag.b; b; : : : ; b/ be the diagonal Bayesian (or self-reliance) matrix. We can rewrite equation (4) as˛t
and equation (5) asˇt
6 Moreover, it is assumed they do that in such a way that the nal posterior remains in the same conjugate family as the prior. i.e. since the initial prior is represented by a Beta distribution, I will assume the posterior will always be a Beta distribution. is is done by assuming that agents share the real-valued parameters rather than sharing the whole belief (distribution). is assumption is neutral to all results and asymptotically equivalent to the case in which agents update their beliefs as a linear combination of Beta distributions. e bene t of doing it is that the both algebra and intuition get clearer. Moreover, in the spirit of the bounded rational assumption, it is arguable that agents nd easier to handle the mental computation involved in this process when dealing with real numbers than with the whole distribution. 7 One may also think of agents sharing opinions (mean) and precisions (variance) with each other rather than sharing distribution parameters. ose are equivalent modeling strategies, we only need to use the relationships y DCˇand 2 D˛.˛Cˇ/ 2 .˛CˇC1/ to fully determine˛andˇ. Algebraic manipulation yields˛D
where, W D B C .I B/ O g is a homogeneous row-stochastic matrix. Notice that since the graph G induced by the Adjacency matrix g is assumed to be strongly connected, the graph induced by W is trivially strongly connected as well.
T
Before illustrating the network e ects over the public opinion when agents are exposed to ambiguity, I rst focus on explaining what is expected to happen in the case of a single individual.
For that, one might imagine that this is a special case of the environment introduced in the previous section when the parameter b D 1. In this regard, the following result shows that only two types of opinions might emerge when agents interpret ambiguity under con rmatory bias.
Proposition 1 (Polarization). If individual i randomizes interpretation of ambiguous signals accord-
ing to Equation (1), fully relies on signals and disregards people's opinions (no network e ect), then his opinion converges to either .1
almost surely, where N i D E t OE i;t . e result holds for any initial belief.
e rst thing to notice is that both le and right biased opinions may be formed with some positive probability and that both are biased since any limiting opinion is a weighted average that places weight on the con rmatory bias and weight 1 in the true state Â. us, if the fraction of ambiguous signals realized is zero, i.e. D 0, then agents would learn the state asymptotically and no bias is observed. In this regard, it is clear that con rmatory bias is the main source of misinformation. Moreover, individuals may exhibit polarized opinions even if individuals with di erent con rmatory bias observe a common stream of evidence. In this case, the degree of polarization naturally depends on the relative bias and the initial priors. Some agents would naturally have a right bias and others a le bias and the intensity of the resulting polarization depends on the mass of these groups.
Moreover, depending on the sizes of Â and , we can guarantee which type of opinion will emerge. For that, it is convenient to partition the space M D OE0; 1 2 (unit square) into three regions: region L characterized by both state Â and ambiguity "su ciently" low, region R characterized by the combination of "su ciently" high state Â and "su ciently" low ambiguity whereas region W is the complement of the union of L and R. If the pair .Â; / falls in to the region L, then we can say that with probability 1 just the le -biased opinion emerges. Conversely, if the pair falls in to the region R, then with probability 1 the right-biased opinion is formed with probability 1. If the pair falls in to the area W, then we can not tell which opinion type will be formed as both might emerge with some positive probability. is remark is generalized as follows.
Proposition 2 (Opinion types likelihood). For any individual with con rmatory tendency, rightbiased opinion emerges with probability 1 when the frequency of ambiguity is su ciently low and the state is su ciently high (i.e. .Â; / 2 R), whereas le -biased opinion emerges with probability 1 when both the state and the frequency of ambiguity are su ciently low (i.e. .Â; / 2 L). In all other cases (i.e. .Â; / 2 W), opinion type is a Bernoulli random variable which takes the value 1 (right-biased) with probability p and the value 0 (le -biased) with probability (1 p). e result holds regardless his initial beliefs and the observed sequence of signals.
e proof relies on guring which combinations of Â and are su cient to let both types of opinion to fall in the same side of the 0-1 spectrum and which combinations lead opinions to diverge in location (one above 0.5 and the other below 0.5). In mathematical terms, we have that those partitions are
e intuition of Proposition 2 is depicted in Figure 2 for three cases of con rmatory bias. In case 1, when the agent is roughly impartial, case 2 when the agent has and intermediary level of con rmatory bias and case 3 when agent is biased.
( ) case 1:
e lightly shaded areas on the right represent the set of parameters (vertical axis) and Â (horizontal axis) that ensures the emergence of right-biased opinion, whereas the darkly shaded areas represent the set of parameters that ensure the emergence of le -biased opinion. In both areas, for a given level of con rmatory bias, the le (right) biased opinion emerge with probability 1 if there is a favorable combination of low frequency of ambiguous signals and a low state, i.e. below 0.5 (high state, above 0.5). e white area, on the other hand, represents the combinations of Â and such that the opinion type becomes a random variable, i.e. both types might emerge with positive probability. In order to nish conveying the intuition of the results presented so far and to introduce the next result, rst consider the following example. Based on the results shown so far and on the numerical example above, one can see clearly that for an individual with con rmatory tendency, one opinion type is less biased than the other depending on the magnitude of the state Â. Moreover, in regions L and R the opinion type formed, even though biased, is the most e cient with probability 1. is generalizes as follows.
Corollary 1 (E ciency). For any individual with con rmatory tendency and for any ambiguity level, the right-biased (le -biased) opinion is less biased than the le -biased (right-biased) opinion if
. Conversely, both right and le biased opinions are equally biased when Â D e intuition is that these two opinions are not symmetric around Â as shown in the Example 1 above. is happens because the bias of each one depends on the relative size of Â and N i . Since we are restricting a ention to the case in which individual has con rmatory tendency, i.e. N i > 1 2 , it is the case that individuals make less mistakes when they are in the correct side of the spectrum.
For that to happen, the ambiguity has to be low enough to not mislead individuals and the state has to be high (or low) enough to nudge individuals opinions to the correct side.
Besides that, it is not trivial to ascertain analytically the functional form of the probability of emergence of right-biased opinion when Â > 1 2 and the probability of emergence of le -biased opinion when Â < 1 2
. It is possible to see that all parameters related to the priors (˛0;ˇ0), to the signal structure (ı; ; Â ) and to the con rmatory bias intensity ( ) in uence it but it is not clear how to generalize the result. I return to this discussion on Section (5) when I discuss the welfare consequences of di erent network topologies.
Another particular case of interest is the one in which the agent is impartial. In this case, it can be shown that bias is not overcome.
Corollary 2 (Bias from impartiality). If an individual is impartial, then his limiting opinion is
almost surely, regardless his initial prior and the sequence of observed signals.
e reason why impartiality does not overcome bias is because it forces individuals to set a disproportionate probability mass in the center of the spectrum .0; 1/. us, impartiality make agents excessively centrists instead making them neutral towards the possible states. One can show that this phenomenon is a direct consequence of the Beta-Bernoulli conjugate family employed here that would not take place in the case of a binary state space D f0; 1g.
Moreover, under impartiality, for any mass of ambiguity > 0, if the true state is located in the le side of the 0-1 spectrum (Â < , then consensus has a negative bias and lies in , an almost anywhere event. e results presented so far both extend the intuition and contrast with Propositions 4 and 5 (i) in Rabin and Schrag (1999) and with Propositions 2 and 3 in Fryer et al. (2018) . It extends the intuition to the case in which the state is continuously distributed over the interval 0-1, and contrasts because impartiality no longer can help an individual to overcome bias, as per the result above. Moreover, it also contrasts with previous results as long-run learning is an event with probability zero as it happens almost anywhere in the full parameter space. e next result elaborates this argument.
Corollary 3 (No long-run learning). For any individual with con rmatory tendency, long-run learning is an event with probability 0, regardless his initial prior and the sequence of observed signals. is case, at rst, seems to impose an extra challenge because the interpretation of ambiguity not only depends on the initial realization of signals, but also depends on the in uence of friends that potentially interpret ambiguity in di erent ways. e "tug-ofwar" played between le and right biases has one driver more, the network externalities. Before discussing the implications of a network structure, I de ne the concept of consensus and state an instrumental Lemma.
De nition 2. Society reaches a consensus almost surely for any initial beliefs if there is a y such that for a small > 0
e auxiliary result below illustrates, in terms of ergodicity of a Markov chain, the social in uence of agents derived from the reliance weight matrix W presented in equations (6) and (7).
e proof of such statement can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 1. e t -th power of matrix W , W t , converges to a unique row-stochastic matrix with unit rank (all rows the same) as t tends to in nity, i.e.
where the invariant distribution is the normalized le eigenvector of the matrix W associated to the unit eigenvalue, i.e. > W D > and by connected agents, then this will force their priors to converge to a common one. e longer it takes this society to observe some non-empty signal, the more agents interact and the more likely they will nd a common ground. e implications of this result are highlighted in the Section 5 when I explore the e ects of priors heterogeneity on the probability of a aining consensus e ciency. Next, I introduce the result when there are network externalities and non-empty signals are observed with positive probability (ı < 1).
Proposition 5 (Network e ect). With network externalities, the sequences fy i;t g 1 t D1 generated by the update rule converge almost surely to either right-biased consensus .1 /Â C Q N or le -biased consensus .1 /Â C .1 Q N /, for all i 2 N and where˘is the invariant distribution matrix,
Again, the result basically shows that consensus again takes the form of a weighted average between the true state Â and the social con rmatory bias Q N , where the mass of ambiguity is the weight of the later. If D 0, then there is no consensus bias and agent would aggregate information e ciently. Moreover, the consensus (of any type) does not depend on the parameter ı, i.e. the consensus does not depend on the frequency with which the network receives signals.
us, neither a system that remains "quiet" for a long time (high ı) nor a system that receives information all the time (low ı) can in uence consensus. Additionally, the parameter b does impact the vector of social in uence (i.e. the invariant distribution of the matrix W (see Lemma (1)) and therefore does impact consensus. As b ! 0, the social in uence is basically dictated by the normalized adjacency matrix O g and is somehow directly proportional to the degree centrality of the agents. As b ! 1, agents tend to almost disregard in full friends' opinions and the social weight of each individual converges to 1 n .
Moreover, the results above show that the consensus type in this dynamic system is also a tail event, i.e. right-biased consensus will either almost surely emerge as the stable equilibrium or almost surely not emerge. If it does not emerge as an equilibrium of this system, then it is surely the case that the le -biased consensus has emerged as the equilibrium (and vice-versa). As an illustration of this result, Figures (3c) and (3d) show the typical opinion sample path of any agent in the line and wheel networks, respectively, and the convergence to di erent consensus types (horizontal lines) in di erent simulations. Given the importance of the probability of emergence of the e cient consensus in terms of social e ciency, the next section is devoted to numerically characterizes it. e exercise is not trivial and for that I will rely on simulations of the learning process described in Section (3) for selected classical network topologies and for di erent sets of parameters of interest.
R :
Ascertaining p analytically depends on many circumstances. One particular example is when the initial priors at time t D 0 di er. ey can either be skewed to the right or to the le (partisans) and in di erent proportions (degree of partisanship). us, under this circumstance, the society is prone to interpret ambiguous signals as 0 or 1 not only according to the initial realization of the signals, but also according to the initial partisanship. Besides, the heterogeneity of priors has the consequence of creating centrality heterogeneity, i.e. partisan individuals might be located at more or less central nodes. is is a challenging instance because partisans might in uence other agents disproportionately and this can amplify the underlying interpreting dispute in the network. Another example is that agents might di er in the intensity of con rmatory bias they su er, i.e. agents with polar opposite bias (say, i;0 D 0 and j;0 D 1, for some i; j 2 N ) might be directly connected or not and this might play a role on how much this heterogeneity a ects the interpreting con ict. is issue gets particularly hard if one allows di erent partisan individuals to su er from di erent con rmatory bias. A nal example is the association of partisanship unbalance with the frequency with which the society receives signals (i.e. low/high ı). In this case, the less o en signals enter in the network (large ı), the more society behaves as purely DeGrootian agents and consequently the initial heterogeneity of priors might lose importance.
is happens because even though partisans start with very di erent beliefs, agents communicate very o en and might converge to a common prior even before some ambiguous signal enters the network.
ose are just some examples to illustrate the challenging nature of computing p analytically.
at said, I proceed with the analysis of p in two general cases: i) when agents are biased but have common centrist prior and ii) biased agents with heterogeneous priors. Next I explain the strategy employed to control the inherent multi-dimensionality of this exercise. ) and as N Ň ! 1 (! 0), the bell-shaped priors collapse to the point 1 (0), i.e. the precision of the prior diverges and all opinions become extreme.
Heterogeneous priors.
e heterogeneous prior case refers to the situation in which there are three types of agents in the society at time t D 0: centrists (C 0 ) and two partisans, le ists (L 0 ) and rightists (R 0 ). To make a distinction between those agents, rst let's consider two parameters that intend to measure the degree of partisanship of such agents l ; r 2 N. With that, I
de ne such groups as follows: centrists, 
To be more precise, interpretation neutrality does not exist as there is a non-neutral tie-break rule described by Equation (1). us, if the very rst signal happens to be ambiguous, then it will be interpreted as 1 by all agents, as per the tie-break rule. is is without loss of generality for the results presented in this work. e tie-break rule could have been de ned in a way that the initial interpretation would bene t the le -interpretation and intuition and conclusions would remain the same. Finally, if the tie-break rule is neutral towards the initial interpretation, that would require a more intricate update rule that would force agents to keep the prior unchanged when opinions are 0.5 whenever they face an ambiguous signal. In such situation, agents would have to draw another signal until some non-ambiguous realization takes place. I conjecture that results would not change in this case as well, since the neutral tie-break, even though does not bene t any state, could also trap individuals into a wrong state and the nature of the problem would remain the same. e modeling e ort, however, could change signi cantly.
Notice that lim !1 y i;0 is 0, 1 2 and 1, whereas lim !1 2 i;0 is C1, 12 and C1 for le -partisan, centrists and right-partisan, respectively. 5.3. Simulation. In order to compute the empirical frequency with which the e cient consensus emerges as an equilibrium in the system ( O p) when the pair .Â; / 2 W I simulate the learning process described on Section (3) many times for a su ciently long period in all selected classical networks shown in Figure 4 . e number of simulations is described by S 2 N and the agents maximal interaction time is t 2 N.
Selected network topologies
For each simulation I allow some parameters to vary (see details below) so I can capture changes in O p due to changes in such parameters. However, the choice of the parameters is the same for all networks in each simulation so I can properly isolate e ects on O p due to parameters discrepancies.
Moreover, for a small > 0 and given the chosen parameters in each simulation S , the simulated frequency of e cient consensus in a network G is computed as
e description of each exercise follows below.
5.3.1. Exercise 1: common (centrist) prior vs. heterogeneous (balanced) priors. e purpose of this exercise is to understand how heterogeneous priors a ect the probability of emergence of the e cient consensus. For that, I keep the number of partisans in its minimum, one le and one right-partisan so the proportion is balanced, and place them uniformly at random in the available nodes in each simulation. In terms of degree of partisanship, when l D r D D 0 agents have a common centrist prior (uniform distribution over the unit interval) and there are no partisan agents, whereas when l D r D > 0 represents the case of heterogeneous priors in which the degree of partisanship of both partisans is positive and equally balanced.
Moreover, in order to avoid an extra layer of heterogeneity I allow all agents to be biased Q N D i;t D 1 for all i; t. Finally, for every simulation, I x some selected parameters and draw uniformly at random other parameters from the following sets in a way that each network in each simulations has the same parameters. e description is summarized below and the summary statistics of the simulations can be found in Appendix E. e simulated probability of emergence of the e cient consensus O p are reported in the Table 1 . . and low priors heterogeneity ( D 1, low partisanship), there seems to have a non-negative e ect of partisanship on consensus e ciency.
Result 2 (E ciency of low partisanship). In expected terms, a biased society with low partisanship ( D 1) is at least as able to reach the e cient consensus as the same biased society with no partisanship at all ( D 0). that, it is determinant to consensus e ciency. On the other hand, when some partisan agents are present, priors parameters˛'s andˇ's are shi ed up, by right and le -partisans respectively, which makes opinions more robust to the initial signals realizations. However, it seems that there is some sort of "optimal" level of partisanship since high partisanship, for most topologies, has a non-monotonic e ect over the probability of emergence of the e cient consensus. is result is generalized as follows.
Result 3 (Ine ciency of high partisanship). In expected terms, a biased society with low partisanship ( D 1) is at least as able to reach the e cient consensus as the same biased society with high partisanship ( D 30). One exception is the wheel network with four agents (network (F)) in which e ciency seems to increase monotonically with partisanship. e simulated probability O p in those cases are reported in Table and the next result is stated immediately. Moreover, for the case of complete networks we have that population size seems to have no in uence whatsoever on e ciency, for any .
Network Partisans
Result 5 (Complete networks). For biased individuals connected through a su ciently large complete network (n 3), the size of the network is neutral to the expected consensus e ciency, regardless the degree of partisanship.
A nal case of interest is the one in which agents are connected through a line.
Result 6 (Line networks). In expected terms, biased individuals connected through any su ciently long line network (n 3), high partisanship ( D 30) reduces the chance of reaching the e cient consensus. Moreover, for any given level of partisanship > 0, a shorter line (lower n) reduces the chance of reaching the e cient consensus.
C
Con rmatory bias is one of the most notorious cognitive biases documented and it appears in many ways. Since it is a systematic deviation from rationality in judgment, it is expected to have a signi cant in uence in the process of belief formation. In this sense, since social networks appear as a primary tool for many people to get informed and debate their world views, one could expect con rmatory bias to have some in uence on the public opinion formation. To date, however, there has been li le understanding of how such phenomenon in uences public opinion. To shed some light on this topic, I consider a social learning model in which a fraction of signals, external to the social network, is ambiguous and open idiosyncratic interpretation. e interpretation, however, is a ected by individuals' con rmatory biases. Moreover, I also allow agents to be in uenced by friends in their social clique and to set their beliefs to be a linear combination of the (biased) Bayesian posterior and the (also biased) friends' posteriors.
It follows directly from my model that biased individuals connected through a social network can only reach two types of consensus and both are biased, one to the le and the other to the right.
One consensus type, however, is more e cient (less biased) than the other depending on the state.
Moreover, I show that long-run learning is not a ained even if individuals are impartial when interpreting ambiguous signals. ose results contrast with Rabin and Schrag (1999) and Fryer et al. (2018) in which long-run learning takes place with a positive probability and impartiality helps learning the state. Furthermore, the network e ect presented here, together with signals realizations, reinforces the interpreting "tug-of-war" since individuals might have their own biases con rmed (or mitigated) by other agents.
and ii) exacerbates misinterpretation of signals when the degree of partisanship is high, reducing expected consensus e ciency. Moreover, I also show that open-mindedness of partisan agents, i.e. when partisans agree to exchange opinions with partisans with polar opposite beliefs, might reduce expected consensus e ciency in some social topologies. ese results suggest that policies designed to mitigate partisanship and con rmatory bias e ects in social networks have to consider also the positive network externalities induced by them. At any time t , the belief of agent i is represented by the Beta probability distribution with parameters˛i ;t andˇi ;t
.˛i ;t Cˇi ;t / .˛i ;t / .ˇi ;t / Â˛i ;t 1 .1 Â/ˇi ;t 1 , for 0 < Â < 1 0 , otherwise,
where . / is a Gamma function and the ratio of Gamma functions in the expression above is a normalization constant that ensures that the total probability integrates to 1. In this sense,
e idiosyncratic likelihood induced by the agent i 's interpretation of the public signal s t C1 is
and, therefore, the standard Bayesian posterior is computed as
Since the denominator of the expression above is just a normalizing constant, the posterior distribution is said to be proportional to the product of the prior distribution and the likelihood function as
erefore, the posterior distribution is
.˛i ;t C1 Cˇi ;t C1 / .˛i ;t C1 / .ˇi ;t C1 / Â˛i ;tC1 1 .1 Â/ˇi ;tC1 1 , for 0 < Â < 1 0 , otherwise;
Mode. e mode of a random variable beta-distributed is the value that appears most o en. It is the value Â at which its probability density function takes its maximum value. As per Equation (9) Lemma 2. e opinion of every agent i in any point in time t, y i;t , can be wri en as
where
Proof. e update process of both parameters described by the equations (6) and (7) can be solved iteratively for any period t as˛t
In agebraic formulation, we have that each entry of the vector in equation (13) can be wri en as
Similarly for the expression˛i ;t Cˇi ;t using both equations (13) and (14) as follows
erefore, from the de nition of opinion we have that y i;t D˛i ;t i;t Cˇi ;t and the statement is proven.
Lemma 3. Let k 2 OE0; 1, X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : ; X t be a sequence of i.n.i.d. random variables such that P .X t x/ D p and u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : ; u t be i.i.d. U OE0; 1 random variables. Moreover, assume that the pair .X t , u t / is independent, for any t. In this case, the expressions E OE1fu t Ä 1fX t xgkg and E OE1fu t Ä E OE1fX t xg kg are equal.
Proof. e rst expression can be wri en as
e second expression simpli es to
Proof of Proposition 1.
/Â C E t OE1fu t Ä E t OE i;t 1fy i;t 1 0:5g C .1 i;t / 1fy i;t 1 < 0:5gg
e expression above might take two distinct forms because both rational learning and the repeated average process are Martingales. us, convergence is expected to be a ained and random variable E t OE1fy i;t 1 0:5g D P .y i;1 0:5/ takes either value 1 with some positive probability p 2 .0; 1/ or 0 with probability 1 p. For simplicity, say the realization 1 of such R.V.
is called A and B otherwise. erefore,
Proof of Proposition 2. e claim is supported by the solution of two system of inequalities S 1 (for right-biased opinion) and S 2 (for le -biased opinion) below.
e solution of those systems, together with the equation (17) in Proof of proposition 1 ensure the uniqueness of opinion types in the parameter spaces de ned in the statement.
Proof of Corollary 1. From Proposition 1, we can write both right-biased and le -biased opinions as Â C . N i Â/ and Â C .1 N i Â/, respectively, where the second term in each expression represents their respective biases. From those expressions, we can see that both sign and magnitude of those biases naturally depend on the relative size of Â and N i . For both biases to be positive,
. For both biases to be negative, we need
. For the right-bias to be positive and the le -bias to be negative, we need 1 N i < Â < N i to hold. e case in which the right bias is negative while the right-bias is positive never holds, since we assume N i > 1 2
. erefore, we have the following summary.
(1) if Â < 1 N i , then both biases are strictly positive (2) if 1 N i < Â < N i , then right-bias is strictly positive and le -bias is strictly negative (3) if Â > N i , then both biases are strictly negative.
In the case (1) listed above, we say that the right-bias is less than the le bias whenever
. However, this contradicts the assumption that individual is con rmatory and we can conclude that whenever Â < 1 N i , the le -biased opinion is less biased than the right-biased one. In the case (3), we say that the right-bias is less than the le bias whenever .Â N i / < . N i C Â 1/, meaning that the statement is true if N i > 1 2 . erefore, if Â > N i , the right-biased opinion is less biased than the le -biased one. Finally, in the case (2), we say that the right-bias is less than the le bias whenever . N i Â/ < . N i C Â 1/, meaning that it can only be true when Â > 1 2
. ese three arguments together prove the statement and we conclude that the right-bias is less than the le bias whenever Â > 
for all t . Since u t is a continuous U OE0; 1 random variable in every period t , we have that
where F u . / is the cumulative distribution function of U OE0; 1. us, equations (17) and (19) together prove the statement when agents are impartial (both always impartial and moderately impartial).
Proof of Proposition 3. Say extreme opinion 1 (i.e. y i;1 D 1) is formed, then as per Propositions 1 and 2 we know this is the right-biased opinion and therefore it should be the case that 
By Lemma 1 we can split both series in the numerator and denominator in two parts
Since the subindex k spans from t mix onwards (i.e. when the chain is already mixed), we can use the invariant distribution matrix in the previous expression. erefore the limiting opinion becomes lim 1 t 1 t mix
where the term E t 1fu t Ä j;t g is as in Proposition 1, implying that the limiting consensus is
Proof of Proposition 4. From Equation (15) in Appendix C, we know that˛i ;t , for any i , can be iterated forwardly as˛i
Similarly, the expression˛i ;t Cˇi ;t in Equation (16) can be wri en as
us, if b D 0 (i.e. agents do not pay a ention to signals) and for any ı, the opinion of any agent i 2 N at any time t boils down to (2) and (3). In this case, the limiting opinion of any agent i can be wri en as in the case when b D 0 shown above.
A E. S E.1. Tests concerning di erences among k proportions. To decide whether observed di erences among sample proportions are signi cant or whether they can be a ributed to chance we must use tests concerning di erences among proportions. For that, suppose that x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x k are observed values of k independent random variables X 1 ; X 2 ; :::; X k having binomial distributions with the parameters n 1 and Â 1 , n 2 and Â 2 ; : : : , n k and Â k . If the sample sizes are su ciently large, we can approximate the distributions of the independent random variables 
